An improved fingerprinting algorithm for detection of video frame duplication forgery by Hu, Yongjian et al.
DRO 
Deakin Research Online, 
Deakin University’s Research Repository Deakin University CRICOS Provider Code: 00113B 
An improved fingerprinting algorithm for detection of video frame duplication 
forgery 
Hu, Yongjian, Wang, Yufei, Li, Chang-Tsun and Liu, Bei-Bei. 2013. An improved fingerprinting 
algorithm for detection of video frame duplication forgery. In Li, Chang-Tsun (ed), Emerging 
digital forensics applications for crime detection, prevention, and security, IGI Global, Hershey, 
Pa., pp.64-76. 
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-4006-1.ch005 
©2013, IGI Global 
Reproduced with permission. 
Downloaded from DRO:  
http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30123737 
64
Copyright © 2013, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited.
Chapter  5
INTRODUCTION
Due to the popularity of camcorder and multi-
media cell phone, digital video is more and more 
widely used in our everyday life and work. The 
rising of video sharing sites on Internet makes the 
spread of digital video easy and fast. The forgery 
of digital video is also facilitated by a variety of 
video editing software, which may cause serious 
forensic problems if the tampered videos are used 
in legal evidence, news reports or security moni-
toring tapes. Since the detection of video forgery 
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ABSTRACT
Frame duplication is a common way of digital video forgeries. State-of-the-art approaches of dupli-
cation detection usually suffer from heavy computational load. In this paper, the authors propose a 
new algorithm to detect duplicated frames based on video sub-sequence fingerprints. The fingerprints 
employed are extracted from the DCT coefficients of the temporally informative representative images 
(TIRIs) of the sub-sequences. Compared with other similar algorithms, this study focuses on improving 
fingerprints representing video sub-sequences and introducing a simple metric for the matching of video 
sub-sequences. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm overall outperforms three related 
duplication forgery detection algorithms in terms of computational efficiency, detection accuracy and 
robustness against common video operations like compression and brightness change.
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is challenged by the huge amount of digital video 
data, the research of accurate and rapid forgery 
detection algorithms is of paramount significance.
There are various ways of tampering with 
digital videos, inspiring a wide range of detec-
tion approaches, such as the algorithm based on 
compression and quantization (Wang et al., 2006, 
2009; Su et al., 2011), effect of interlacing (Wang 
et al., 2007a), characteristic of noise (Hsu et al., 
2008; Kobayashi et al., 2010), fusion of features 
(Chetty et al., 2010) and so on. Some algorithms 
detect the forgery based on the artifacts brought 
by tampering, such as the motion-compensated 
edge artifacts (Su et al., 2009), the ghost shadow 
artifacts (Zhang et al., 2009) and so on. Among 
various tampering approaches, frame duplication 
is a simple but the most widely used one, so the 
detection of frame duplication has attracted lots 
of attention from researchers. Wang et al. (2007b) 
proposed a frame duplication detection algorithm 
based on correlation coefficient matrix. While 
achieving satisfactory detection accuracy, the 
algorithm requires heavy computational load due 
to the large amount of correlation calculation. To 
reduce the computational cost, Lin et al. (2011) 
proposed to use histogram difference (HD) in-
stead of correlation coefficients as the detection 
features. However, the HD features do not show 
strong robustness against common video opera-
tions or attacks. In practical applications, both 
computational efficiency and robustness must be 
taken into account. To satisfy these requirements, 
we aim at designing a fast and robust duplication 
detection algorithm. This work focuses on improv-
ing fingerprints representing video sub-sequences 
and introducing a simple metric to judge whether 
two video sub-sequences are matched.
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: First, we will review two related frame 
duplication detection algorithms. Our proposed 
detection algorithm will be elaborated afterwards. 
Then we present the results of comparative experi-
ment and discussion. Finally we will conclude the 
paper in the last section.
RELATED WORKS
Wang et al. (2007b) proposed a frame duplication 
detection algorithm. The video is first divided into 
overlapping sub-sequences, with only one different 
frame between adjacent sub-sequences. For each 
sub-sequence, they computed the correlation coef-
ficient between each pair of frames, composing 
a correlation coefficient matrix that carries the 
temporal information of this sub-sequence. To 
judge whether two sub-sequences are duplicated, 
the correlation coefficient between the matrixes 
of these two sub-sequences are calculated and 
compared with a threshold. If the coefficient 
exceeds the threshold, the two sub-sequences 
may be duplicated. To confirm the duplication, 
spatial information is used for further detection. 
Specifically, they divided the two frames into 
non-overlapping blocks and calculated the cor-
relation coefficient between each pair of blocks 
in corresponding positions. They recorded the 
number of block pairs having large correlation 
coefficients. If the number exceeds a predefined 
threshold, they considered the two frames were 
duplicates of each other, which indicated that the 
video had undergone duplication forgery. How-
ever, the calculation of correlation coefficient is 
known to be time consuming; and moreover, the 
correlation coefficient was employed twice to 
represent the temporal and spatial information, 
respectively. As a result, their algorithm requires 
a heavy computation load.
The algorithm proposed by Lin et al. (2011) 
has similar pre-processing operation to that of 
Wang’s (2007b). The video is also divided into 
overlapping sub-sequences with only one differ-
ent frame between adjacent sub-sequences. For 
each sub-sequence, the histogram difference (HD) 
rather than the correlation coefficient between 
each two adjacent frames is calculated:
HD
N
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where h
R
q ,  h
G
q  and h
B
q  represent the histograms 
of R, G and B channels of a frame while h
R
t ,  h
G
t
and h
B
t  represent the histograms of its adjacent 
frame. N
bin
 denotes the number of bins in the 
color histograms.
For a sub-sequence of length N ,  a feature 
vector with N −1  elements is obtained by cal-
culating the HD between each two adjacent frames. 
This vector contains the temporal information of 
the sub-sequence. If the correlation coefficient 
between two HD vectors exceeds a threshold, the 
corresponding two sub-sequences are likely to be 
duplicated. Further investigation based on spatial 
information is then required. The authors divided 
the two suspicious frames into non-overlapping 
blocks and computed the HD between each pair 
of corresponding blocks. They recorded the num-
ber of block pairs having small HD values. If the 
number exceeds a predefined threshold, they 
judged that the two frames were duplicates of 
each other and the video had undergone duplica-
tion forgery. Compared to the correlation coef-
ficient calculation in Wang et al. (2007b), the 
small complexity of HD calculating makes this 
approach more efficient.
THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
Temporal features can reflect the characteristics of 
a video sequence over time while spatial features 
can reflect the characteristics of a frame. The 
algorithms of Wang et al. (2007b) and Lin et al. 
(2011) both adopt a two-step detection scheme in 
which temporal and spatial information of each 
sub-sequence is dealt with separately. However, 
we think that the detection time can be shortened 
when the temporal information and the spatial 
information are integrated into one feature. A pos-
sible way of integrating the temporal information 
and the spatial information is to consider a video as 
a three-dimensional matrix and to perform three-
dimensional discrete cosine transform (3D-DCT) 
(Coskun et al., 2006) on it. But the complexity 
of computing 3D-DCT is known to be very high. 
We find that the DCT of temporally informative 
representative images (TIRI-DCT) proposed in 
Esmaeili et al. (2011) is an appropriate feature for 
each sub-sequence. TIRI-DCT was originally used 
for a digital fingerprint for video copy detection. 
In this paper, we borrow the idea and improve 
fingerprints representing video sub-sequences. 
We then apply these fingerprints to frame dupli-
cation detection.
The construction steps of the fingerprint are 
described as follows. Firstly, the video is divided 
into overlapping sub-sequence with only one 
different frame between adjacent sub-sequences. 
Each sub-sequence is downsampled in time 
domain to reduce the number of frames to be 
computed. Downsampling often causes the loss of 
temporal information, but the detection accuracy 
would not be affected as long as the sampling in-
terval is smaller than the length of the duplicated 
video sequence. The TIRI of each sub-sequence 
is calculated as the weighted sum of the frames:
l l
m n k m n k
k
J
,
'
, ,
=
=
∑ω
1
      (2)
where l
m n k, ,
 is the luminance value of the m n,( ) th
pixel of the kth  frame, and ω
k
 is the weight of 
the kth frame, J  denotes the frame number of 
the sub-sequence after downsampling. Appar-
ently the TIRI contains the temporal information 
of each sub-sequence.
Secondly, the TIRI is divided into overlapping 
blocks of size 2 2w w× ,  each having 50% of the 
area overlapped with the vertical and horizontal 
adjacent blocks, respectively. Figure 1 shows the 
partition of each block. The reason for overlapping 
the blocks is to get adequate spatial information 
for accurate detection.
Thirdly, for each block, we perform two-di-
mensional DCT and extract the two AC coeffi-
cients closest to the DC coefficient as the features. 
The two AC coefficients represent the vertical 
and horizontal texture features of the block. The 
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coefficients can be calculated through the follow-
ing two equations:
α
i
T
i
v B E=       (3)
β
i
T
i
E BV=       (4)
where α
i
 and β
i
 denote the first vertical and 
horizontal AC coefficients of the ith  block B
i
,  
respectively. V  is a column vector with 2w ele-
ments and
V w w w= −( ) ( ) ( ) cos . , cos . , , cos . ,0 5 2 1 5 2 0 5 2pi pi pi pi
E  is an all ones column vector of length 2w.  
With Formulas (3) and (4), we can obtain the two 
AC coefficients without fully performing the DCT, 
which greatly reduces the computational cost.
Finally, the AC coefficients obtained are bi-
narized to act as the digital fingerprint of each 
sub-sequence. We binarize the vertical and hori-
zontal coefficients separately so as to reduce the 
loss of directional information of each block. 
Specifically, suppose each TIRI is divided into 
N
B
 overlapping blocks, we calculate the medians 
mα  and mβ  of the AC coefficients as follows:
m median
m median
N
N
B
B
α
β
α α
β β
=
=





( ,..., )
( ,..., )
1
1
      (5)
These two medians are used as the thresholds, 
respectively. In particular, a vertical coefficient 
α
i
 is binarized as 0 if it is less than the threshold 
mα;  otherwise, it is binarized as 1. Likewise, a 
horizontal coefficient β
i
 is binarized. After the 
operation, we concatenate the two binarized coef-
ficient vectors together to form a digital fingerprint 
that contains both the temporal and spatial infor-
mation of each sub-sequence. Note that, if the 
number of blocks N
B
 is even, mα /mβ  is not 
any vertical/horizontal AC coefficient but the 
average of the two numbers in the middle of the 
sorted vertical/horizontal AC coefficients. As a 
result, the binarization processing always yields 
the equal number of 0’s and 1’s vertically as well 
as horizontally. So the resulting fingerprint con-
sists of the same number of 0’s and 1’s. However, 
if the number of blocks N
B
 is odd, mα /mβ  is 
the number in the middle of the sorted vertical/
horizontal AC coefficients. In this case, we have 
to binarize the medians themselves. If both mα  
and mβ  are binarized as 0 or 1, the number of 0’s 
and that of 1’s in the fingerprint are not equal. To 
Figure 1. The block partitioning of the TIRI
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evenly reflect vertical and horizontal information 
from the AC coefficients of the DCT, this work 
proposes to binarize mα /mβ  as 0 and at the 
same time, mβ /mα  as 1. This scheme produces 
a balanced fingerprint, that is, the number of 0’s 
and 1’s are equal. We have to stress that Esmaei-
li et al. (2011) once proposed another binarization 
way to create the digital fingerprint. They first 
calculated the median of all the vertical and 
horizontal AC coefficients, and then binarize 
those coefficients using the median as the thresh-
old to obtain a binary sequence, i.e., the fingerprint. 
Because their median is calculated from all the 
AC coefficients without distinguishing directions, 
it is most likely to create a fingerprint which 
contains more elements from the vertical coef-
ficients than from the horizontal coefficients or 
the opposite. In other words, the resulting finger-
print cannot evenly reflect the characteristics of 
vertical coefficients and horizontal coefficients. 
This is the basic difference between that method 
and our method in the aspect of construction of 
the fingerprint.
After obtaining the fingerprints of the sub-
sequences, we need to compare each pair of the 
fingerprints to determine whether they are dupli-
cate sub-sequences. If duplication forgery exists, 
the fingerprints from different sub-sequences 
should be similar. Hence, how to measure the 
similarity of two sub-sequences is crucial for the 
success of the detection algorithm. In this work, 
we propose to use the Hamming distance as a 
metric for fingerprint matching. The Hamming 
distance would be small when two video sequences 
are the same or very similar. As a result, if the 
Hamming distance between the fingerprints of two 
sub-sequences is less than a predefined threshold, 
we think that the frame duplication forgery exists. 
The calculation of Hamming distance is simple 
and is realizable using XOR binary operation. 
Hence the detection process of our algorithm 
is computationally efficient. Figure 2 gives the 
flowchart of our algorithm.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Each video clip used in our experiments has 300 
frames, with a sequence of about 100 frames 
intentionally duplicated. The original videos are 
in YUV format without compression.
Parameters Settings
There are three CIF format video clips used in ex-
periments. We intentionally select videos with dif-
Figure 2. Flowchart of the proposed algorithm
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ferent characteristics. In particular, coastguard_cif 
has more dynamic content, where both the object 
and the background are moving fast. For news_cif, 
only very few regions (e.g., mouth) on its objects 
in front have obvious movements. However, part 
of its background (e.g., the content on the small 
screen) changes very fast. Specifically, the content 
on the small screen is a clip of ballet and this clip 
is repeatedly played twice. In other words, news_cif 
is a video clip with the background containing par-
tially duplicated content. On the other hand, in the 
first half of foreman_cif, this video has relatively 
static background and moving object in front. But 
in the last half, the object in front disappears and 
only the relatively static background is left. The 
sample frames of these three videos are showed 
in Figure 3 through Figure 5. We tampered with 
these video clips and the detailed duplication 
information is listed in Table 1.
Now we discuss how to set up the parameters 
employed in our algorithm, including the length 
of sub-sequence, the interval of downsampling, 
ω
k
 for (2.2), the block size used for the construc-
tion of the fingerprint, and the decision threshold 
for frame duplication detection. The length of the 
sub-sequence is an important parameter in ex-
periments. A short length would increase the 
calculation time while a long length would miss 
the detection of duplication sub-sequences 
shorter than this length. So the length of sub-
sequence is the lower bound for duplication 
forgery detection. In Wang et al. (2007b), the 
length of the sub-sequence was set to 30. For 
detection of 100 to 200 long duplication frames, 
this setting may make a good tradeoff between 
computational complexity and detection capabil-
ity. In this work, we set the length of the sub-
sequence to 31 instead of 30 due to the effect of 
downsampling. When generating the TIRIs, we 
tend to reserve the first and last frames of the 
sub-sequence after downsampling in order to well 
represent the sub-sequence. We set the downsam-
pling interval to 4 so that a 31-frame long sub-
Figure 3. Sample frames from videos used in 
experiments: coastguard_cif
Figure 5. Sample frames from videos used in 
experiments: foreman_cif
Figure 4. Sample frames from videos used in 
experiments: news_cif
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sequence can be downsampled into 7 frames for 
the calculation of TIRI. In this case, both the first 
and last frames are selected. For the sake of com-
parison, this work also sets the length of sub-
sequence to 31 for the algorithms in Wang et al. 
(2007b) and the HD-based algorithm (Lin et al., 
2011). The other parameters for these algorithms 
have not been altered.
For ω
k
 in Formula (2-2), we choose the ex-
ponential weighting function ω γ
k
k= ,  where 
γ = 0 64.  according to Esmaeili et al. (2011). 
The block size w  is determined based on the 
results in Table 2, where the results have been 
obtained with different values of w.  Note that, in 
this paper, the TPR (True Positive Rate) is calcu-
lated by dividing the number of correctly de-
tected forgery frames by the total number of the 
forgery frames, and the FPR (False Positive Rate) 
is calculated by dividing the wrongly detected 
forgery frames by the total number of the no 
forgery frames. The use of TPR and FPR can 
comprehensively describe the performance of an 
algorithm. We can see in Table 2 that a smaller 
value of w  often generates a longer fingerprint 
and obtains higher detection sensitivity but re-
quires longer computation time, while a larger 
value of w  makes the fingerprint shorter and the 
robustness stronger but the detection sensitivity 
lower. Apparently, the setting of w = 8  is a good 
tradeoff between time consumption and detection 
sensitivity.
The setting of decision threshold for the Ham-
ming distance affects the detection performance. 
A low threshold would raise the sensitivity of 
detection, and at the same time, produce more 
false alarms. However, a high threshold would 
yield the converse result. In practice, the selection 
of an optimal threshold is quite complex since it 
involves the resolution of the video employed, the 
length of digital fingerprint and the block size. 
According to our experiments, we set the decision 
threshold to 3 in this work, which is a tradeoff 
between detection accuracy and robustness.
Test on Video Clips without 
Undergoing Video Operations
We first evaluate the performance of the proposed 
algorithm on videos that have not undergone video 
operations. Here video operations refer to content-
preserving operations/attacks (distortions) that are 
made to the video intentionally or unintentionally. 
The commonly used operations include format 
changes, signal processing operations, changes in 
brightness/contrast, added noise, rotation, crop-
ping, logo insertion, compression, etc. To justify 
our discussions, we compare our algorithm with 
the correlation coefficient-based algorithm (Wang 
et al., 2007b), the HD-based algorithm (Lin et 
al., 2011) and the TIRI-DCT based algorithm 
(Esmaeili et al., 2011). It is worth mentioning 
that the TIRI-DCT based algorithm (Esmaeili et 
al., 2011) was originally proposed for video copy 
detection rather than frame duplication detection. 
Generally, video copy means the copy of all the 
frames that constitute the video. So we directly 
apply this algorithm to frame duplication detec-
tion. The experimental results are given in Table 
3. The TPR values for all of the four algorithms
are 100%. On the other hand, the FPR values for
all the algorithms except the TIRI-DCT based
algorithm (Esmaeili et al., 2011) are 0. For the
TIRI-DCT based algorithm (Esmaeili et al., 2011),
however, it has a 6% FPR when dealing with
news_1. This result implies that the algorithm is
very sensitive to the duplicated content, and even
this duplicated content (i.e., the drama shown on
Table 1. Videos and their duplication information 
Forgery 
Video Duplication Information
coast-
guard_1
Copying 150th to 279th frames of coastguard_cif to 
its 0th to 129th frames.
news_1 Copying 0
th to 99th frames of news_cif to its 150th 
to 249th frames.
fore-
man_1
Copying 0th to 119th frames of foreman_cif to its 
150th to 269th frames.
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the small screen in the background) is truly part 
of the original content and has not undergone any 
video processing, this algorithm still regards the 
video clip as forgery video. Apparently, such an 
over sensitivity is not a good property because it 
would greatly increase false alarm rates in real-
world applications. In terms of computational 
efficiency, our algorithm requires much less time 
than the algorithm in Wang et al. (2007b). It also 
has a small advantage over the algorithm in Es-
maeili et al. (2011). But the HD-based algorithm 
requires even less time than our algorithm due to 
its small computational complexity. Overall, the 
HD-based algorithm (Lin et al., 2011) has the 
best performance on videos without undergoing 
video operations.
Test on Video Clips with Brightness 
Change
A fingerprint should be robust to the content-pre-
serving distortions present in a video (Esmaeili et 
al., 2011). Due to various reasons (e.g., to improve 
video quality, save storage space or communicate 
Table 2. Performance with different values of block size w 
Video Value of w TPR (%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_1
4 100 0 63008
8 100 0 16014
16 100 20 12573
news_1
4 100 0 68234
8 100 0 16391
16 100 100 12542
foreman_1
4 100 0 65832
8 100 0 16462
16 100 46.67 12682
Table 3. Results about video clips without video operations 
Video Algorithm TPR(%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_1
Ours 100 0 16014
TIRI-DCT 100 0 19734
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 238056
HD 100 0 11555
news_1
Ours 100 0 16391
TIRI-DCT 100 6 20233
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 176483
HD 100 0 14570
foreman_1
Ours 100 0 16462
TIRI-DCT 100 0 20077
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 178464
HD 100 0 10498
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on a narrow band-width network), video opera-
tions are widely used in real-world applications, 
which may greatly affect the performance of 
forgery detection algorithms. This work focuses 
on investigating the robustness of the detection 
algorithm against typical video processing such 
as brightness change and video compression. In 
this subsection, we first address the performance 
of the proposed algorithm on videos subject to 
brightness change. We increase by 1 the average 
luminance of the duplicated frames to generate 
the tampered video coastguard_2, news_2 and 
foreman_2 and reduce by 1 the average luminance 
of the duplicated frames to produce the tampered 
video coastguard_3, news_3 and foreman_3. The 
detection results are given in Table 4.
It can be observed that the FPR values for the 
four algorithms remain the same as those obtained 
on the videos without undertaking video opera-
tions. With respect to TPR, three algorithms have 
obvious changes. However, the performance of 
the correlation-based algorithm (Wang et al., 
2007b) is least affected. The main reason is that 
the mean subtraction operation in the normalized 
correlation calculation can suppress the effect of 
the average change to pixel values to some degree. 
We can observe that the algorithm in Wang et al. 
(2007b) outperforms either our algorithm or the 
Table 4. Results about video clips with brightness change 
Videos Algorithm TPR (%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_2
Ours 99.23 0 15958
TIRI-DCT 99.23 0 19453
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 236044
HD 0 0 1201
coastguard_3
Ours 100 0 15896
TIRI-DCT 100 0 19593
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 233813
HD 0 0 1201
news_2
Ours 100 0 16494
TIRI-DCT 100 6 20233
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 176342
HD 0 0 5366
news_3
Ours 100 0 16479
TIRI-DCT 100 6 20225
Correlation Coefficient 100 0 176358
HD 0 0 6427
foreman_2
Ours 83.33 0 16621
TIRI-DCT 83.33 0 20124
Correlation Coefficient 83.33 0 181662
HD 0 0 1419
foreman_3
Ours 83.33 0 16495
TIRI-DCT 83.33 0 20061
Correlation Coefficient 83.33 0 178792
HD 0 0 1232
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algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) for coast-
guard_2 although it has the same good perfor-
mance as our algorithm in other cases. On the 
other hand, the impact of brightness change on 
our algorithm and the algorithm in (Esmaeili et 
al., 2011) can be reflected by the decrease of TPR 
values in the cases of coastguard_2, foreman_2 
and foreman_3. However, our algorithm is a little 
better than the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) 
when we take into account the FPR values. The 
latter algorithm still suffers from a 6% FPR when 
handling news_2. We owe the similar performance 
between our algorithm and the algorithm in Es-
maeili et al. (2011) to the fact that both of them 
adopt the same AC coefficients of DCT for gen-
erating the fingerprint. The average luminance 
increase or decrease often does not have much 
impact on the AC coefficients. In contrast, the 
HD-based algorithm in Lin et al. (2011) has the 
worst performance among the four algorithms. 
For all the test videos, the TPR values for this 
algorithm are 0, meaning that it can barely resist 
the effect of brightness change. The underlying 
reason is that such a video operation usually results 
in a significant change to the histogram difference.
Let us compare computation time (i.e., com-
putational complexity) of these four algorithms. 
The correlation-based algorithm in Wang et al. 
(2007b) runs quite slow due to large amount of 
correlation computations. Our algorithm greatly 
outperforms that algorithm because it does not 
rely on correlation computations. Our algorithm 
is also better than the algorithm in Esmaeili et 
al. (2011) to some degree. The reason is that 
the medians of coefficients in our algorithm are 
respectively calculated in vertical direction and 
in horizontal direction, and thus the complexity 
is lower because the sequence length is halved in 
this situation compared with that in Esmaeili et 
al. (2011). Consider the HD-based algorithm fails 
in this situation, we do not compare its computa-
tion time with that of other algorithms. Based 
on the detection performance and computational 
complexity, our algorithm is superior to the other 
three algorithms.
Test on MPEG Compressed Videos
Videos in MPEG format are very common in daily 
life. So the performance of detection algorithms on 
compressed videos becomes an important issue in 
practical applications. To evaluate the performance 
of the proposed detection algorithm, we generate 
six MPEG compressed videos. For generality, this 
work adopts the GOP (group of pictures) structure 
of (15, 3), which is one of the most commonly 
used settings. By employing the encoding bit rates 
of 4 Mbps and 3.2 Mbps, we obtain the videos 
coastguard_4M, coastguard_3.2M, news_4M, 
news_3.2M, foreman_4M and foreman_3.2M. 
The detection results of the four algorithms are 
given in Table 5.
With respect to FPR, all the four algorithms 
have good performance in this aspect except a 2% 
FPR for our algorithm in the case of news_4M. 
On the other hand, the TPR for all of the four 
algorithms declines seriously. It can be seen that 
the correlation coefficient-based algorithm in 
Wang et al. (2007b) and the HD-based algorithm 
in Lin et al. (2011) can hardly detect any duplica-
tion. In contrast, our algorithm and the algorithm 
in Esmaeili et al. (2011) show a certain degree of 
robustness. For the encoding bit rates of 4 Mbps, 
the TPR values for our algorithm are apparently 
higher than those for the algorithm in Esmaeili et 
al. (2011). However, with the increase of compres-
sion, the latter may outperform our algorithm. 
The TPR values for the algorithm in Esmaeili et 
al. (2011) are higher than those for our algorithm 
in the case of coastguard_3.2M and foreman_3.2M 
when the encoding bit rates decline to 3.2 Mbps. 
It is a little surprising that the TPR values for the 
algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011) are 0. Perhaps 
it is because news contains less dynamic contents 
and the MPEG compression reduces the features 
of those contents. From this result, the flexibility 
of our algorithm to deal with videos with differ-
ent contents is also exhibited.
As for computation time, our algorithms run 
faster than the algorithm in Esmaeili et al. (2011). 
Since both the algorithm in Wang et al. (2007b) 
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and the algorithm in Lin et al. (2011) fail in this 
situation, we do not discuss their computation 
time. Obviously, our algorithm still has the best 
overall performance among the four algorithms.
CONCLUSION
Frame duplication is a low-cost video operation to 
change the meaning of a video. Such a manipula-
tion can be used innocently and maliciously. When 
a video is used as evidence in court of law, we 
have to verify whether this video has undergone 
any video forgery manipulation including frame 
duplication. Therefore, the study on this topic 
is important from the perspective of forensic 
investigation. Although some attention has been 
paid to this research area, the gap between the 
algorithms available in literature and the real-
world applications is still large. More efforts need 
to be made for the design of more efficient and 
robust algorithms.
In this paper, we have proposed a frame duplica-
tion detection algorithm. Our fingerprint is based 
on the improved features derived from TIRI-DCT. 
Our major contributions are the construction of 
new fingerprints of sub-sequences and the use of 
a simple metric for video matching. Compared 
with current related algorithms, the proposed 
detection algorithm achieves a better tradeoff be-
Table 5. Results about MPEG compressed videos 
Video Algorithm TPR (%) FPR (%) Time (ms)
coastguard_4M
Ours 51.54 0 17185
TIRI-DCT 50.77 0 20685
Correlation Coefficient 0 0 238758
HD 0 0 7753
coastguard_3.2M
Ours 32.31 0 17242
TIRI-DCT 48.46 0 20592
Correlation Coefficient 0 0 234187
HD 0 0 7675
news_4M
Ours 37 2 17467
TIRI-DCT 0 0 21356
Correlation Coefficient 0 0 180242
HD 0 0 7566
news_3.2M
Ours 50 0 17430
TIRI-DCT 0 0 21340
Correlation Coefficient 0 0 176358
HD 0 0 8143
foreman_4M
Ours 71.67 0 17514
TIRI-DCT 44.17 0 21075
Correlation Coefficient 0 0 178885
HD 0 0 6786
foreman_3.2M
Ours 53.33 0 17195
TIRI-DCT 56.67 0 21013
Correlation Coefficient 0 0 178841
HD 0 0 6536
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tween computation time and detection capability. 
It shows stronger robustness against typical video 
operations like MPEG compression and brightness 
change. On the other hand, our experiments also 
exhibit some drawbacks of the proposed algorithm, 
for example, the 2% FPR in the case of news_4M. 
We think that these drawbacks mainly result from 
the structure of fingerprints, the metric employed 
for video matching, and the selection of decision 
threshold. In our future work, we will focus on 
investigating these issues.
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